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The court rejected this argument.
If a class action suit were allowed,
uninsured depositors would race to
the FDIC in order to assert a
preferred claim. The court concluded that this result would make
a "mere mockery" of the equality
promised by the National Bank
Act. Where a fraud affected or
potentially affected all depositors,
all depositors should be treated the
same. Therefore, the court held
that a pro rata distribution of
assets among all of Penn Square's
depositors was the only fair remedy.
Eileen B. Libby

Mandatory Inclusion of
Commercial Leases in a
Cooperative Conversion
of Rent Stabilized
Apartments Did Not
Violate the Sherman Act
Recently, in 305 East 24th Owners Corp. v. Parman Co., 714 F.
Supp. 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), the
United States District Court for
the Southern District of New York
held that a seller's including four
long term commercial leases in its
offer to convert rent stabilized
apartments into cooperative units
did not constitute an illegal tying
arrangement in violation of the
Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 - 7
(1989). In applying the Second
Circuit's five-pronged test to determine whether an illegal tying arrangement existed, the court ruled
that the tenants failed to show that
the sellers had economic power in
the tying product market or that
the seller's acts had a substantial
anticompetitive effect in the tied
product market. Additionally, the
court concluded that the commercial lease provision of the conversion contract was not unconscionable because the tenants had meaningful choices in deciding to enter
into the contract and the contract
terms were not unreasonably favorable to the sellers.
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Background
In August of 1980, Parman Co.
("Parman") submitted to the New
York State Attorney General a
preliminary offering plan to convert the rent stabilized apartments
at 305 East 24th Street to cooperative ownership. Under a cooperative conversion, the tenants purchase stock in and become sole
owners of the corporation that
owns the residence building. The
amount of stock a tenant owns
represents the value of that tenant's residence. Parman's preliminary offering plan provided that
any tenant who chose not to buy
into the cooperative would have to
vacate the building when it was
converted from an apartment to a
cooperative. In addition, the plan
required that Owners Corp. (the
corporation of tenants which
owned the building under the cooperative agreement) enter four
long term leases enabling the sellers to retain control of the commercial management services, garage services, laundry services, and
building management services.
The tenants formed the 305 East
24th Street Tenants' Association
("Tenants' Association" or "Association") and took a number of
actions to improve their position
in negotiating the cooperative conversion agreement. First, the Tenants' Association retained legal
counsel familiar with cooperative
conversions. Second, eighty percent of the tenants signed No-Buy
Agreements which stated that no
tenant who signed the Agreements
would purchase cooperative shares
until two thirds of the tenants
signed releases from the Agreements. Third, the Association sent
letters to the tenants on a continuing basis to inform them of the
progress in the negotiations. The
letters made particular reference to
the disputed long term leases.
On January 25, 1983, Parman
submitted a formal offering plan to
the New York State Attorney General's Office. The formal plan contained the same commercial lease
agreements. The cover of the plan
included the admonition "See
'Special Risks' Page 1" in bold
print. A portion of the "Special
Risks" section read, "These leases

may not be 'arms-length' transactions and may result in [Owners
Corp.] realizing less than the full
economic value of the garage space
and commercial space." (emphasis
in the original) Unlike the preliminary plan, however, the formal
plan proposed a non-eviction conversion. Thus, if a tenant chose not
to buy her shares of the cooperative, she could remain in the building as a rent stabilized tenant.
On August 12, 1983, the Tenants' Association sent Parman a
letter proposing to reduce the price
per share in the Owners Corp., to
reduce the downpayment required
to purchase shares, and to increase
the rent for the commercial leases.
On April 6, 1984, after negotiating
with the Tenants' Association, Parman amended the offering plan to
incorporate a number of the Association's demands: the price per
share in the Owners Corp. was
reduced by 25% for current tenants
buying into the cooperative; the
down payment was reduced from
10% of the purchase price to a flat
sum of one thousand dollars; Parman agreed to obtain financing for
those tenants unable to acquire it
otherwise; and Parman agreed to
pay thirty-five thousand dollars of
the Tenants' Association's legal
fees. The commercial leases were
left intact.
Following a Tenants' Association question and answer session
regarding the amended plan, the
Association's five-member Executive Committee recommended
that the tenants sign releases from
the No-Buy Agreements. By October 25, 1984, the date of the closing, eighty-five percent of the tenants had signed agreements with
Parman to buy shares in Owners
Corp.
Owners Corp. sued Parman in
the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New
York to prevent the conversion.
Owners Corp. argued that the conversion agreements violated the
Sherman Act antitrust provision
and that the commercial leases
were unconscionable.
Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Parman argued that the district
court did not have subject matter
(continued on page 52)
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jurisdiction over the Sherman Act
antitrust claim. Previously, the
United States Supreme Court had
established alternative "in commerce" and "effect on commerce"
tests for determining a federal
court's jurisdiction over a Sherman Act claim. McLain v. Real
Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc.,
444 U.S. 232 (1980). Under these
tests, the plaintiff must show either
that the defendant acted in interstate commerce or, if the activity
was local in nature, that the defendant's actions had "an effect on
some other appreciable activity demonstrably in interstate commerce." Id., at 242.
Applying the "effect on commerce" test, the court rejected Parman's contention that the sale of
the building together with the
leases was a purely local activity.
The court held that because of New
York City's proximity to New Jersey and Connecticut, potential outof-state competitors were effectively precluded from bidding on
the management services provided
for under the leases. Therefore, the
conversion agreement affected interstate commerce and the court
had jurisdiction over the antitrust
claim. In addition, the court noted
that it had diversity jurisdiction
because four of the cooperative
conversion stockholders resided
outside of New York state and
their purchases exceeded three
hundred thousand dollars.
The Tying Claim
Owners Corp. alleged that Parman's conditioning the cooperative conversion on including the
commercial leases imposed a tying
arrangement in violation of section
1 of the Sherman Act. 15 U.S.C. §
1.In a tying arrangement, the sale
of one product (the tying product)
is conditioned on the buyer purchasing a different product (the
tied product).
In order to establish an unlawful
tying arrangement, a plaintiff must
prove five elements: 1) that separate tying and tied products existed; 2) that the seller had suffi52

(from page51)

cient economic power in the tying
product market to coerce the buyer
into accepting the tied product; 3)
that the seller actually coerced the
buyer into accepting the tied product; 4) that the sale had anticompetitive effects in the tied market;
and 5) that the sale had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Applying this test, the court held
that Owners Corp. had established
that separate products existed, that
Parman coerced the buyers, and
that the sale involved a substantial
amount of interstate commerce in
the tied product market. However,
the court concluded that Owners
Corp. failed to show that Parman
had sufficient economic power in
the cooperative conversion market
or that the sale had anticompetitive effects in the tied product
market.
Separate Tying and Tied Products. The court agreed with Owners
Corp. that the building and the
commercial leases represented two
distinct products. In determining
that two separate products existed,
the court considered whether consumers would commonly seek to
purchase the tying product (the
building) separate from the tied
product (the commercial leases).
Parman argued that the sale of the
cooperative units with the commercial leases represented one integrated product. The court disagreed and held that there was a
demand for cooperative apartments separate from a demand for
commercial, garage, laundry, and
building management services. In
fact, Parman had converted six
other buildings into cooperative
apartments exclusive of such
leases.
Coercion. Next, Owners Corp.
argued that Parman coerced it into
accepting the leases as part of the
conversion. The court agreed for
two reasons. First, although the
tenants willingly subscribed to the
plan, the leases were clearly detrimental to the tenants' interests.
Second, the court believed the testimony provided by Owners Corp.
that Parman refused to sell unless

the leases were included. The Tenants' Association objected to the
leases throughout the negotiations
and the tenants ultimately agreed
to the leases because they thought
it necessary to achieve the conversion.
Effect on Interstate Commerce.
The court also held that the sale
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce. In determining
whether the effect of the sale was
substantial, the court focused on
the dollar amount involved rather
than the percentage of the tied
product market which was foreclosed by the arrangement. The
commercial leases encompassed
$300,000 a year in management
services over a forty year period.
The court held that the dollar
amount constituted a substantial
amount of interstate commerce in
the tied product market.
Economic Power in the Tying
Product Market. To establish that
the seller had economic power, a
plaintiff must show that the seller
controlled a large share of the
market in the tying product, or that
the seller had some advantage not
shared by its competitors. Owners
Corp. argued that Parman had an
advantage over its competitors because 305 East 24th, being the
tenants' home, was unique. Therefore, Parman had the economic
power to raise prices and compel
the tenants to accept "burdensome" terms. The court rejected
the argument because the tenants
had not shown that the building
was irreplaceable or dissimilar to
others on the market. Moreover,
nearly half of the tenants assigned
their purchase rights to someone
else or sold their unit within three
years of the conversion.
Alternatively, Owners Corp.
argued that the building was
unique because it represented a
once in a life time opportunity to
purchase an apartment for an "insider" (discounted) price. The
court stated that to construe this as
bestowing economic power on the
seller would "turn anti-trust law on
its head." 714 F. Supp. at 1307.
Volume 2, Number 2/Winter, 1990
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The court noted that Parman could
not offer a cooperative unit to an
outsider unless a tenant refused to
purchase her shares and did not
stay in the building as a rent
stabilized tenant. Because the tenants could remain without buying
into the cooperative, Parman had
to offer the cooperative units at
substantially less than their market
value. Therefore, the court held
that Parman did not have substantial economic power in the tying
product market.
Anticompetitive Effects in the
Tied Market. Owners Corp. offered testimony that the cooperative agreement precluded other
businesses from bidding on the
services provided under the commercial leases. The court stated,
however, that the agreement must
affect an "appreciable" number of
buyers in the tied market, thus
foreclosing a substantial volume of
commerce from competition. In
this case, the leases pertained to
commercial, garage, laundry and
management services in only one
building. The court held that any
effect the sale had on the vast
market for these services was minuscule. Additionally, the court recognized that before the cooperative conversion Parman owned the
building and provided the management services, thereby precluding
other vendors of management
services. After the conversion, Parman continued to provide these
services and, therefore, the agreement did not diminish competition
in the tied market. Therefore, the
court rejected Owners Corp.'s
Sherman Act antitrust claim.
Unconscionability Claim
The court next considered
whether including the commercial
leases in the conversion plain was
unconscionable. In order to establish an unconscionability claim
under New York law, the plaintiff
must establish two glements: first,
that one of the parties lacked any
meaningful choice; and second,
that the contract terms were unreasonably favorable to the other
party. Addressing the first prong of
the unconscionability test, the
court concluded that the tenants
exercised a meaningful choice because they formed a tenants assoVolume 2, Number 2/Winter, 1990

ciation, were represented by legal
counsel, engaged in negotiations
over several months and entered
into the cooperative agreements
aware of the disadvantageous
leases. Also, because the plan was a
non-eviction conversion, the tenants were not compelled to purchase their units but could have
remained in the building indefinitely as rent stabilized tenants.
Moreover, because the tenants purchased their units significantly
below market value, the court did
not consider them victims of an
unconscionable contract.
Regarding the second prong of
the unconscionability test, the
court concluded that the commercial leases were not unreasonably
favorable to Parman when considered in light of the agreement as a
whole. When there was an eviction
clause in the plan, the tenants
signed the No-Buy Agreements.
However, after the eviction clause
was removed, the tenants rescinded their No-Buy Agreements.
The court reasoned that if the
tenants believed the commercial
leases were so disadvantageous as
to make the entire plan inequitable, the tenants would not have
rescinded their No-Buy Agreements. Therefore, the court also
rejected Owners Corp.'s unconscionability claim.
Tayebe G. Shah-Mirany

Eliminating Abusive
Collection Practices by
Third Parties Under the
Federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act
Recently, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming ruled on the applicability of the federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA" or
"Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692 to 1692o
(1989), to a Wyoming collection
agency collecting a check upon
which the drawer had stopped payment. In Johnson v. Statewide Collections, Inc., 778 P.2d 93 (Wyo.
1989), the court held that the collection agency violated the

FDCPA by failing to properly verify the alleged debt after the consumer indicated that he disputed
the debt, by asserting an amount
due that the agency was not entitled to recover, and by contacting
the debtor when the agency was, or
should have been, aware that the
debtor was represented by an attorney. The court also held, however,
that the collection agency did not
violate the FDCPA by using its
"doing business as" name in its
letters to the debtor, or by failing to
advise the debtor that it had returned the dishonored check to the
retail store.
Background
On November 11, 1986, Freddie
Johnson ("Johnson") purchased a
shotgun from a retail store for
$129.99 and paid for it by check.
Johnson later discovered that the
shotgun was defective. He returned
the shotgun to the store and requested a refund. The store employee accepted the shotgun but
refused to return Johnson's check.
Johnson contacted his bank and
stopped payment on the check.
When Johnson's bank returned the
check to the store, the store sent the
check to Statewide Collectionrs,
Inc. (doing business as "CheckRite") for collection.
Johnson attempted to resolve
the matter by contacting the store,
but the store referred him to
CheckRite. When Johnson contacted CheckRite, he was referred
back to the store and told that he
must contact the store with any
problems he had with the merchandise or his check.
On November 21, CheckRite
sent a "Return Check Notice" to
Johnson demanding that he pay
$144.99 directly to CheckRite. The
amount demanded included a $15
"service charge" in addition to the
merchandise price. Johnson immediately contacted his attorney who
wrote a letter to the store stating
that Johnson disputed the alleged
debt. A copy of the attorney's letter
was sent to CheckRite.
After receiving the letter from
Johnson's attorney, CheckRite
sent a second notice directly to
Johnson. This notice demanded
(continued on page 54)
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